Seventh Circuit Holds Text Messages Are Not "Calls" Under TCPA's DNC Provision (2026)
Key facts (2026-08-09, via search snippet):
- On July 14, 2026, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that TCPA Section 227(c)(5) — the Do-Not-Call registry private-right-of-action provision — does not permit plaintiffs to sue over unwanted text messages, reasoning that "calls" under the statute's ordinary meaning does not encompass text messaging (which did not exist when the TCPA was enacted in 1991).
- The court declined to defer to the FCC's prior interpretive guidance extending "calls" to cover texts, holding it is no longer bound by that guidance following the Supreme Court's McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson decision (which held district courts are not bound by FCC orders under the Hobbs Act).
- This ruling concerns the DNC/227(c)(5) private right of action, not the 227(b) prior-express-consent requirement — it does not disturb PEWC obligations covered by constraint.tcpa-prior-express-written-consent-sms.
Relationship to existing KG nodes. This is a distinct legal thread from the consent-acquisition and revoke-all constraints already tracked (constraint.tcpa-prior-express-written-consent-sms, constraint.tcpa-revoke-all-universal-opt-out) — those govern consent and suppression architecture regardless of litigation theory. This source instead affects litigation-risk assessment for SMS programs: circuit-court fragmentation on whether DNC-based suits reach text messages is an emerging pattern the Technical Reviewer may want to fold into a tradeoff or risk note rather than a constraint body edit. Flagged in evolution-log/2026-08-09/web-refresh.md as a draft candidate rather than applied directly, per this routine's authority limits.